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The following case-study describes the circumstances surrounding Ferrari’s separation 
from Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA). This paper’s structure is divided between the narrative 
and a teaching note. The case narrative describes all the events that result in Ferrari’s full 
separation from FCA and FCA’s recent most changes. The teaching note intends to analyse the 
possibility of investing in Ferrari’s IPO, the process of its separation and at the same time 
analysing FCA’s restructuring. 
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Ferrari’s IPO and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) 
 
How to value Ferrari and deal with the company’s stake in FCA? 
It is Friday, October 9th, 2015 and Ferrari’s road show will start next week. Marco 
Vestri, chairman, CEO and founder of MV Investments faces a major decision regarding the 
opportunity to invest in Ferrari’s IPO, which was presented to him by a senior analyst a few 
weeks ago. Beyond that, Vestri also believes that it is time to re-evaluate the company’s 
holdings in FCA due to recent corporate changes such as the demerger of its industrial activities, 
the alliance with Chrysler and now Ferrari’s separation. 
Currently, MV Investments is a prestigious and reputable hedge fund known for taking 
part in all the major deals in the automotive industry. In 1990 for example, Vestri was 
sufficiently impressed by Fiat’s Panda Elettra, the first mass-produced electric vehicle, that he 
decided to acquire 2% of Fiat’s stock. Although the Panda Elettra ended up being a commercial 
failure, Marco believed in the company’s future and by 2000 had increased the stake to its 
current 5% holding.   
 Will Ferrari’s IPO be the next big deal in the automotive industry? If so, Marco will 
certainly want to be a part of it, but a few questions remain to be answered. Will the IPO reflect 
Ferrari’s fundamentals or simply the hype coming from the asset managers (most of them 
wishing to own the company’s cars many of whom probably lust after the Ferrari product)? 
Considering the small size of the offer, is it possible that Ferrari’s stock ends up being a small-
stock1 or even an orphan stock2?  Will most of FCA’s shareholders, who are destined to receive 
the stock as a result of the spin-off that follows the IPO, decide to sell their shares? Will this 
IPO be underpriced, resulting in potential short-term gains? Will this spin-off generate a long-
term over-performance, as suggested in the academic literature of this type of divestiture? 
                                                          
1 Stock of a company that has a small market capitalization. 
2 A stock that is mostly ignored by investors. 
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Ferrari’s roadshow will be in town next week and Vestri wants to be ready for the 
meeting to effectively understand if the IPO is a good opportunity. At Vestri’s request, a big 
part of his staff work throughout the weekend in order to do the necessary analysis and help 
him decide on these two matters. 
 
Fiat S.p.A 
On July 11th, 1899 Fiat S.p.A was founded in Turin, Italy and the first car built was the 
Fiat 4 HPi (Exhibit 1). In 1903 the company went public while it also initiated the production 
of its first vehicles for transportation of goods. Throughout the years, production kept 
expanding, new models were created, and the company entered more markets.  
In 1908 Fiat began to manufacture aircraft engines and in 1919 entered the Italian 
agriculture market with its first tractor, the “702”. By 1949, the company had grown to require 
71.000 employees. Fiat launched Italy’s first diesel-powered passenger car in 1953. Fiat’s 
acquisition of 50% of Ferrari in 1969 was seen as an opportunity to expand the business and 
add to its product line. Keeping its eye on the future, as mentioned earlier, in 1990 Fiat launched 
the Panda Elettra.   
Fiat is a company with a long and proud history and has always been quite a big player 
in the industry (7th top manufacturer in 2014 – Exhibit 2). 
 
The prancing horse (Cavallino Rampante) - Ferrari 
Ferrari’s history is linked to the life of its founder, Enzo Ferrariii (Exhibit 3). In 1924, 
at 26 years of age, he became a racing driver for Alfa Romeo. Only five years later, he formed 
Scuderia Ferrari, Alfa Romeo’s racing division. However, in 1938, Alfa Romeo created the 
Alfa Corse to bring its racing division back “in house” and put Enzo in charge of the new racing 
initiative. Enzo left Alfa Romeo a year later under the provision that he wouldn’t use the Ferrari 
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name in association with races or racing cars for at least four years. So, on September 13th, 
1939 Ferrari opened Auto Avio Costruzioni, the company that would eventually become the 
greatest name in auto racing. Although the 1939 date is often used as the founding of Ferrari, it 
was not until 1947 when Ferrari’s real story began with the launch of the 125 S (Exhibit 4), the 
first car to be graced with Ferrari’s now ubiquitous prancing horse logo. Enzo, through the sale 
of his automobiles, was able to fund Scuderia Ferrari, which was resurrected to be the racing 
division of his own company (the same name that Ferrari’s racing division still uses today). 
During the 1950s Ferrari become known worldwide due to its success in the Formula 
Oneiii. By 1960, however, due to the importance of developing the industrial side of the 
business, Enzo Ferrari implemented significant changes to the company, restructuring it from a 
family run business to become a limited company in 1960. In 1969 Ferrari again made major 
changes when it agreed to sell 50% of its equity to Fiat in order to increase its competitiveness; 
the immediate effect was to increase available investment funds and the possibility to use Fiat’s 
plants. In the late 1960s commercial sponsorships arrived to Formula One. Ferrari, famous for 
its plain red cars, was initially quite resistant to sponsorships, however, its reluctance gradually 
waned and eventually even Ferrari agreed, and logos began to appear on Ferrari’s one seater. 
Initially the cars only sported a few logos of some of the F1 technical partners, such as Magneti, 
Brembo and Agip. It took until 1977 before the logo of the Fiat group, 50% owners of the 
Ferrari company since 1969, appeared on the famed red Formula ones. Enzo passed away in 
1988, the year in which Fiat increased its stake in Ferrari to 90%iv - paying around $13.6 million, 
with the remaining 10% staying in the hands of Enzo’s son, Piero Ferrari.  
The new millennium was marked by a great sporting success for Ferrari, perhaps in no 
better way than through the example of its most well-known racing driver Michael Schumacher, 
who won the Formula One championship for Ferrari from 2000 to 2004. More recently, 
presence of Ferrari’s auto product lines in emerging markets - such as the Middle East, China, 
9 
 
Japan and the rest of the Far East - was boosted as the company’s position in the US, UK and 
German markets were consolidated.   
 
Chrysler 
Chrysler was founded in 1925 in Detroitv, Michigan, United States of America by 
Walter Chrysler. He and his team ensured that the products of Chrysler’s brand would be 
“affordable luxury vehicles known for innovative, top-flight engineering”vi. Within a decade of 
being founded, Chrysler had earned the moniker of Detroit’s “engineering company” for 
innovative design solutions such as a wheel with a ridged rim designed to keep a deflated tire 
from flying off the wheel, an engineering advancement adopted by the auto industry worldwide.  
In 1998 Chrysler and its subsidiaries merged with the German-based Daimler-Benz AG, 
creating the combined entity DaimlerChrysler AG. However, on May 14th, 2007, 
DaimlerChrysler AG (thereafter renamed Daimler AG) announced the sale of the Chrysler 
Group (renamed Chrysler LLC) to Cerberus Capital Management, an American private equity 
firm. With the financial crisis of 2007-2009 this already frail company was pushed to file for 
Chapter 11 on April 30th, 2009vii to be able to continue to operate as a going concern, while 
renegotiating its debt structure and other obligations. 
 
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (FCA) 
Fiat Investments N.V. was incorporated in the Netherlands - for tax purposes - as a 
public limited liability company on April 1st, 2014. The objective of this company was to carry 
out the reorganization of the Fiat group (Fiat S.p.A.) following its recently completed 
acquisition of Chrysler on January 21st, 2014. Upon effectively merging Fiat S.p.A. into Fiat 
Investments N.V. this new holding company was renamed Fiat Chrysler Automobiles on 
October 12th, 2014viii. The objective was to become a leading global automaker as a single 
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integrated automaker so after Fiat completed the acquisition of Chrysler, they were merged into 
FCA (in Exhibit 5 you have information of FCA and its peers). 
Currently, FCA is a multinational corporation which designs, engineers, manufactures 
and sells vehicles and related parts and services, components and production systems 
worldwide. It has 165 manufacturing facilities, 85 R&D centers, dealers and distributors in more 
than 150 countries and around 228.690 employees (data at December 31st, 2014)ix. It has a wide 
range of brands: Abarth, Alfa Romeo, Chrysler, Dodge, Fiat, Fiat Professional, Jeep, Lancia, 
Ram, SRT, Maserati and Mopar (parts and service), Comau (production systems), Magneti 
Marelli (components) and Teksid (iron and castings). The group also provides retail and dealer 
finance, leasing and rental services which support the car business. This is done through 
subsidiaries, joint ventures and commercial agreements with specialized financing services 
providersx. (You can find FCA’s financials in Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7.) 
 
Dynamics of the automotive industry 
The automotive industry was affected by the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, an 
industry which was already weakened by an increase in the price of automotive fuels due to the 
energy crisis. Both European and Asian automobile manufacturers were affected, but the 
biggest impact was felt in America namely on the big three (General Motors, Chrysler and 
Ford). General Motors and Chrysler, headquartered in Detroit are linked to the Detroit crisis 
which lead the city itself to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcyxi.  
Through the nationalization of both General Motors and Chrysler - they filed for 
bankruptcy Chapter 11 - the US President Barack Obama intervened to restructure these two 
companies and according to Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, “[he] saved the American 
auto industry from extinction."xii 
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Looking at sales statistics provided by Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs 
d'Automobilesxiii (OICA), despite anomalous decreases in 2008 and 2009, car sales have 
continuously increased from 2005 to 2014, reaching 88 million automobiles sold in 2014 (see 
Exhibit 8). For this continued growth to be possible, prices had to be cut which affected profit 
margins leading to the consolidation of this competitive industryxiv. 
Luxury cars market 
The luxury performance car market has not yet returned to pre-recession levels. 
However, as shown in the Exhibit 9, Ferrari’s sales in recent years have proven less volatile 
than the its competitors. Ferrari believes this is due to their strategy of maintaining low 
production volumes compared to consumer demand, as well as the wider range of models and 
more frequent product launches compared to the competitors. An interesting statistic to consider 
is the number of high net worth individuals which as you can see in Exhibit 10 has steadily 
increased - this can help explain why Ferrari has been able to maintain its sales at a more or less 
constant level since a big portion of its target are these type of individuals. 
 
FCA’s restructuring 
Even though Chrysler’s acquisition was only completed in 2014, the connection 
between Fiat and Chrysler actually started in 2009 when Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 on April 
30th. After the initial transaction on June 10th, 2009, that resulted from the bankruptcy filing, 
Fiat held a 20% ownership in Chrysler with the remaining 80% belonging to the Chrysler’s 
employees Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association (VEBA) Trust3, the U.S. Treasury 
and the Canadian Government. The Fiat-Chrysler alliance was announced as a “global strategic 
alliance” and its objectives were to share products, platforms, technology, globalized 
distribution, procurement4 and world class manufacturing. 
                                                          
3 A trust fund whose purpose is to provide employee benefits. 
4 Joint purchasing programs designed to yield savings through negotiations with common suppliers. 
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Fiat continued increasing its stake in Chrysler and on January 21st, 2014, the acquisition 
was complete with Chrysler becoming an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Fiat after the 
purchase of VEBA’s 41.46% equity interest in Chrysler for 4.3 billion US dollarsxv. This valued 
Chrysler at $10.37 billion while in total it cost Fiat $6.3 billion to fully acquire the corporation. 
Chrysler’s acquisition was not the only change in Fiat’s restructuring. On September 
16th, 2010, shareholders approved the demerger of Fiat S.p.A.’s industrial activitiesxvi - 
agricultural and construction equipment, trucks and commercial vehicles and related powertrain 
systems - and the creation of a new group headed by Fiat Industrial S.p.A. which was completed 
on January 1st, 2011 (In Exhibit 11 you can see the structure of the transaction). The reasons 
behind the demerger arose from the differences between the Auto and the Industrial sidesxvii of 
the business in terms of competitive environment, product requirements, level of R&D 
expenditure required and the profile of potential investors.  
The Auto side operates in a highly competitive market where price, quality, the level of 
choice and customization, style, safety, fuel economy and functionality are key competitive 
drivers. In this market, the purchasing decision of customers is also dependent on the overall 
level of consumer confidence and the availability of credit. In addition, this business requires 
significant investment in research and development to satisfy customer demand for continuous 
innovation in relation to new products and services, emission control systems as well as driver 
and passenger safety solutions.  
Contrarily, the Industrial side, on the other hand, operates in a market where the key 
competitive drivers are brand reputation, an extensive distribution network, financial services 
and breadth of product range. In addition to the sophistication of the product offer, performance 
in this sector is also influenced by general economic conditions, demand for food, and climate 
conditions. The requirement for investment in research and development is not so high due to 
the lower relative dependence on aesthetic design of the models offered.  
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These differences most likely lead to a conglomerate discount and so the demerger 
provided: “Greater strategic and financial clarity for each business; Increased focus and 
opportunity for independent development; Improved value perception for Industrial 
activities.”xviii It was a partial and proportional spin-off, partial because part of the equity of Fiat 
Industrial remained inside the company and proportional because the exchange ratio between 
stocks of Fiat S.p.A. and Fiat Industrial S.p.A. was 1:1.  
In 2014, Ferrari shipped 7.255 cars, recorded net revenues of €2.762 Million and Net 
Income of €261 Million (see Exhibit 12 and Exhibit 13) so it seemed to be performing wellxix. 
Despite that, there were some conflicts between Ferrari and FCA which became public. In 
September 2014, FCA CEO Sergio Marchionne created considerable friction when he publicly 
criticized the recent performance of Ferrari’s Formula One racing team, Scuderia Ferrari, and 
called the performance, “unacceptable and absolutely non-negotiable.”xx It is mentioned in a 
Bloomberg report that Marchionne said, “Ferrari Chairman, Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, 
needs to ensure that the supercar brand’s Formula One team produces more wins.”xxi The rising 
tension between Marchionne and Montezemolo culminated in Montezemolo’s October 13th, 
2014 resignation. The Wall Street Journal reported that Marchionne and Montezemolo had a 
disagreement over Ferrari’s production volumes where Marchionne wanted Ferrari to increase 
sales figures to 10,000 vehicles per year. 
 Shortly after, on October 29th, 2014, the Board of Directors of FCA announced its 
intention to separate the Ferrari business from FCA. The objective of the separation was to 
enable Ferrari to pursue its business strategies with, “greater operational and financial 
independence while preserving the unique character”xxii of their business and organization. 
Regarding FCA’s intentions AutoPacific’s analyst David Sullivan said, “if you need to raise 
capital to fund the overhaul of Alfa Romeo and you're dead serious about it, this is what makes 
the most sense. Tesla stock is no joke and I am pretty sure Fiat Chrysler would love to get in on 
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that type of success.”xxiii In addition to that, Marchionne said that, “pursuing a separate path for 
Ferrari is necessary to secure FCA’s 2014-2018 Business Plan and work toward maximizing 
the value of our businesses to our shareholders."xxiv 
 
Ferrari’s separation 
The separation of Ferrari from Fiat may be an opportunity to unlock a portion of 
Ferrari’s real value and it appears to be in a good position to do so since it is a profitable 
company, a unique product, and one of the most recognizable brand names in the world; not to 
mention the “it” factor which can attract investors (big hype surrounding Ferrari’s IPO – 
Exhibit 14). Being a standalone company with an iconic brand name will allow them to be in 
a better position to promote and extend the value of the brand, maintain their heritage and further 
enhance Ferrari’s position among the world’s premier luxury lifestyle companiesxxv (estimates 
for Ferrari’s free cash flows can be found in Exhibit 15).  
Ferrari’s separation from FCA can be divided in a series of three transactions (in Exhibit 
16 you can see an overview of the overall transaction): 
1. The restructuring: Ferrari N.V., a fully owned subsidiary of FCA, was used to carry 
out the restructuring (at the time, Ferrari operated under Ferrari S.p.A.). Ferrari N.V. acquired 
the assets and business of providing sales, after-sales and support services for the Ferrari brand 
from Ferrari North Europe Limited, one of Ferrari S.p.A.’s existing trading subsidiaries, and in 
exchange, issued a note for £2,8 Million. FCA transferred all of the issued and outstanding share 
capital that it previously held in Ferrari S.p.A. (representing at that point in time 90%) to Ferrari 
N.V. which in exchange issued to FCA a note for €7,9 Billion (the “FCA Note”). Ferrari N.V. 
issued to FCA 85,7% of both their common shares and special voting shares 5who in turn 
                                                          
5 To obtain special voting shares, a shareholder must register a number of common shares in the “Loyalty Register” 
which should be kept there for three years in order to be entitled to receive one special voting share for each share 
registered. They have the same voting rights as a common share, but they have no economic value. 
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contributed with €5,1 Billion. Ferrari N.V. used the proceeds to repay FCA a portion of the 
FCA Note: the remaining principal outstanding on the FCA Note being €2,8 Billionxxvi.  
Piero Ferrari transferred his 10% interest in Ferrari S.p.A. to Ferrari N.V. in exchange 
for common shares and special voting shares representing approximately 14,3% Ferrari N.V.’s 
share capital. Then, Piero Ferrari transferred approximately 4,3% of Ferrari N.V.’s common 
shares and the same number of special voting shares to FCA in exchange for €280 Million in 
cash. As a result, Piero Ferrari retains an interest representing 10% of the economic and voting 
interest in Ferrari N.V. and FCA retains the remaining 90%xxvii. (For a clearer view of this 
operation see Exhibit 17.) 
2. The IPO: 2. The IPO: FCA will be selling 17.175.000 common shares of Ferrari, 
equal to approximately 9% of the Ferrari share capital: Ferrari N.V. has 188.921.600 common 
shares outstanding. Ferrari N.V. decided to do the listing on the New York Stock Exchange, 
expecting it to increase its investment appeal, particularly in the United States which has 
historically been one of its largest and most important markets. The common shares were 
approved for listing on the New York Stock Exchange under the most appropriate symbol for 
the greatest Formula One racing company, “RACE”xxviii.  
The IPO underwriters will offer part of the common shares directly to the public at a 
price within the initial range set by Ferrari: $48 – $52xxix with the underwriters paying the price 
minus an underwriting discount of $1,56 per sharexxx. If Ferrari is valued at the top of the range, 
this will imply a market capitalization of $9.824 Million (Exhibit 18 provides prevailing capital 
market information). The opening day is the 20th October of 2015. The selling shareholder has 
granted the underwriters the option to purchase up to an additional 1.717.150 common shares 
at the initial public offering price less the underwriting discount of $1,56 per share for a period 
of 30 days after the initial offering to cover over allotments, if any. 
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Of course, investing in Ferrari N.V.’s commons shares has its risks. Ferrari N.V. may 
not succeed in preserving and enhancing the value of the Ferrari brand, which drives demand 
and revenues. The small number of car models it produces, and sells may result in greater 
volatility of its financial results. Its brand image depends, in part, on the success of the Formula 
One racing team, additionally the revenues from Formula One activities may decline and/or 
related expenses may grow. These are just a few examples of the risks Ferrari faces. 
3. The spin-off: The third and final step of the separation is the spin-off (will this 
transaction lead to an over-performance as evidenced in Exhibit 19?). Following completion 
of the offering, FCA intends to separate its remaining ownership interest in Ferrari N.V. and 
distribute that ownership interest to its shareholdersxxxi. This transaction is expected to be 
completed through a series of steps, all conducted under the Dutch law for demerger and all of 
which are predicted to be concluded in early 2016xxxii (take a look at Exhibit 20): 
a) The “First Demerger”: FCA would transfer all of the common shares and special 
voting shares held by it in Ferrari N.V. to FE Interim B.V., a newly-formed Dutch private 
limited liability company. Pursuant to the First Demerger, each holder of FCA common shares 
will receive one common share in FE Interim for each common share in FCA immediately prior 
to the First Demerger and each holder of FCA special voting shares will receive one special 
voting share in FE Interim for each special voting share of FCA held immediately prior to the 
First Demerger. 
b) The “Second Demerger”: FE Interim will transfer all of its common shares and special 
voting shares in Ferrari N.V. to FE New N.V., a newly-formed Dutch public limited company. 
Pursuant to the Second Demerger, each holder of FE Interim’s common shares will receive one 
common share in FE New for every ten common shares in FE Interim held immediately prior 
to the Second Demerger, and each holder of FE Interim special voting shares will receive one 
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special voting share in FE New for every ten special voting shares in FE Interim held 
immediately prior to the Second Demerger. 
Immediately following the completion of the Second Demerger, all common shares and 
special voting shares of FE Interim will be cancelled. Ferrari N.V. is then merged into FE New 
under the following conditions: Each holder of Ferrari N.V.’s common shares, that is, public 
shareholders from IPO and Piero Ferrari, would receive one common share of the surviving 
company (FE New) for each common share in Ferrari N.V. they hold immediately prior to the 
Merger. Each holder of Ferrari N.V.’s special voting shares would receive one special voting 
share of the surviving company for each special voting share held immediately prior to the 
Merger. The merged company is to be renamed Ferrari N.V. 
After the completion of the Separation, Ferrari N.V. may apply for admission to listing 
and trading of its common shares on the Mercato Telematico Azionario6 (MTA)xxxiii. 
 
The decision  
The decision sits squarely before Vestri. Should he invest in Ferrari’s IPO? If so, what 
is the appropriate price to offer for its shares? Will it reflect Ferrari’s intrinsic value? Is the 
senior analyst merely relying on the fact that IPOs are usually underpriced and that spun-off 
companies tended to perform very well and were a good source of short-term profit? Regarding 
FCA, does it make sense to maintain the company’s holdings? Have the recent changes affected 
FCA’s performance? How is FCA performing compared to its industry peers? And finally, 
being a shareholder of FCA, does it make sense to invest in Ferrari’s IPO when you will likely 
get shares of Ferrari from the spin-off?   
                                                          
6 The Italian Market where shares, convertible bonds, warrants and option rights are traded. It is dedicated to mid 
















The following teaching notes have the objective of studying Ferrari’s separation from FCA and 
FCA’s current situation. The case focuses on Ferrari’s IPO and spin-off as well as FCA’s 
restructuring, making it especially suited for an Applied Corporate Finance course. When 
solving this case, students should understand the steps leading to Ferrari’s separation, its 
execution and the motives behind FCA’s restructuring. A set of proposed questions follows, 
together with the suggested responses. Finally, the outcome of the case is approached in the last 
section. 
 
1. What’s the purpose of FCA’s restructuring?  
Discuss also the importance of each step in Ferrari’s separation. 
As described in the case, there are three main changes which are part of FCA’s 
restructuring: acquisition of and merger with Chrysler, the demerger of FCA’s industrial 
activities and finally Ferrari’s separation. 
 Taking into account how the industry works and the crisis it went through, mergers are 
not necessarily surprising. In order to compete, car manufacturers have to offer better prices or 
at least include more specifications for the same price which significantly decreases profit 
margins. Thus, consolidation is one the way to maintain profitability through sharing products, 
platforms, technology and distribution, all of which can lead to economies of scale and scope. 
 Regarding the demerger of Fiat’s industrial activities, as mentioned in the case, the 
rationale behind this transaction focuses on the differences between the Auto and the Industrial 
side of Fiat. It consists of an equity carve-out and for that reason it is in Fiat’s best interest that 
the Industrial activities continue to perform well after merger since it will still be part of the 
group. One benefit of the carve-out is that Fiat Industrial can use stock option compensations 
to boost corporate performance. Fiat appeared to be suffering from a conglomerate discount, so 
this transaction made sense since it allowed investors to value the companies separately and 
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increased management focus which added value to both firms. Bodnaruk, Massa and Zhang 
(2009) argue that the conglomerate discount can be explained, “as conglomerates being less 
financial constrained than single segments firms. A financially constrained firm is forced to 
select only the high return investments and therefore its Q will be very high.”xxxiv  
 Finally, we have Ferrari’s separation. For the first step, Ferrari N.V., which at the time 
was a fully owned subsidiary of FCA, was used to facilitate many of the merger transactions 
noted above during the restructuring. This step can be seen as an initial separation, since 
everything related to Ferrari, namely Ferrari S.p.A.7, was moved to Ferrari N.V. From Exhibit 
17 you can see that the net result for FCA of this transaction is an increase in € 2,52 billion 
(7,9B – 5,1B – 0,28B) in the assets side of the balance sheet. FCA benefits from Ferrari’s initial 
restructuring by improving its debt ratio. Then, from the IPO, FCA will obtain the proceeds and 
consequently raise more capital; however, since Ferrari after the spin-off will be a separate 
entity, its powerful brand will no longer be associated with, or of assistance to FCA. As you 
can see in TN-Exhibit 1, FCA’s profit margin is very low8 therefore in order to keep the 
business running and fund its business planxxxv, this was a way to raise capital. 
 
2. How much is FCA worth without Ferrari? 
To answer this question a valuation based on comparable multiples is used based on 
information of Exhibit 5. In TN-Exhibit 2 you can see the output of this valuation. 
The P/E ratio and Market to Book ratio will not be considered since it is better to “use 
enterprise-value multiples” to avoid multiples being “systematically affected by capital 
structure”xxxvi as stated in an article by McKinsey. Since the Sales/EV multiples will reflect 
differences due to different margins, the focus will be on EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT.  
                                                          
7 How it operated at the time. 
8 FCA’s profit margin is way below the industry average for Auto & Truck 6,35% and Auto Parts 4,76%. 
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 Looking at EV/EBITDA the implied market capitalization is nearly twice as much what 
FCA is currently worth (€12.297 Million) which is not likely to be true. However, considering 
EV/EBIT and looking at both the median value and the value based on companies with similar 
growth, it leads to a valuation between €8.734 and €13.612 Million. 
 
3. How much is Ferrari worth as a standalone corporation?  
When valuing a company, there are two approaches which are usually used, discounted 
cash flows or valuation using multiples (comparable traded firms’ multiples or transaction 
multiples). 
Valuing Ferrari is not an easy task. To value a company that is seeking to go public, the 
most common method is using multiples but for this to be possible the comparable firms must 
be public. Firms that may be compared with Ferrari include Bugatti, Aston Martin, Lamborghini 
or Porsche which aren’t public. Tesla may be a good test case. Even though it produces electric 
cars, it has the same type of hype surrounding the company as Ferrari and it also produces 
luxurious sports cars. In addition to comparing with Tesla it may also be interesting to compare 
Ferrari with other car automakers such as FCA’s peers. Moreover, a comparison with other 
luxury firms will also be considered. Before going into the multiple valuation, however, it may 
be useful to consider a discounted cash flow analysis. 
Since the free cash flows used for the DCF are from professor Damodaran’s valuation 
(Exhibit 15), it is important to understand and discuss the growth applied to revenues and to 
the terminal value. In the first five years of the estimation period, he uses a growth rate of 4% 
and from year 6 to year 10 the growth declines at constant rate, ending with a growth rate of 
0,7% in year 10 which is equal to the long-term risk-free rate. Since Ferrari’s growth rate in the 
previous year was 18,29%, the 4% used in the initial years is quite conservative which is likely 
to reflect in a lower valuation than what Ferrari is worth. It makes sense to start decreasing the 
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growth rate from year 5 forward because, when a company becomes more mature, it is expected 
to have a lower growth rate. Ending the estimate with a growth rate of 0,7% in year 10 which 
is equal to the long-term risk-free rate and using this same rate for the terminal value can be, 
once again, a bit conservative since it is low. Another option for the perpetuity growth rate 
could be a value somewhere between the historical inflation rate of 2-3%. Regarding this aspect 
it is also interesting to mention Tesla and its commercial success, indicating the rise of electric 
cars which may affect Ferrari’s viability in the long-run making the long-term growth rate of 
0,7% a more reasonable assumption. 
To discount the cash-flows to the present, the approach used was the weighted average 
cost of capital method (WACC). The cost of debt is based on the synthetic rating. For the cost 
of equity, a beta was necessary, so looking at Exhibit 5 the average beta of the automotive 
industry is 1,39 and for the luxury companies it is 1,01 which shows that luxury firms are less 
cyclical. Then there is Tesla with a beta of 0,94 in line with the luxury companies and since 
Tesla is more similar to Ferrari than the other luxury companies considered, this was the chosen 
beta. As we saw in Exhibit 9 Ferrari’s revenues were notably more stable, less volatile and less 
cyclical than the competitors, so it should have a small beta. Tesla’s beta was used because it is 
likely to be similar to Ferrari in this aspect, it is less cyclical and more stable because people 
who buy Ferrari’s and Tesla’s are usually well moneyed and are not normally significantly 
affected by economic downturns. Further, we could look at Ferrari as a defensive stock which 
Societe Generale defines as “a stock whose profit growth and therefore its price has a very low 
correlation to the economic activity. No matter how the economy is doing, the revenues, the 
earnings and the cash flows of the company remain relatively stable and so the share price.”xxxvii 
Of course, typically defensive stocks are from industries such as Health care, Household and 
Personal Care however Ferrari seems to have a similar behaviour. Tesla’s beta was unlevered 
and then relevered based on Ferrari’s capital structure (the market value of Debt was estimated 
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and for the market capitalization a price of $50 per share – in the middle of the range – was 
assumed). Applying the CAPM formula, the cost of equity can be estimated. Then applying the 
WACC formula and discounting the cash flows and terminal value, the value of operations is 
obtained. In order to go from the value of operations to market capitalization two approaches 
can be considered: Subtract the net debt provided in Exhibit 5 from the value of operations or 
a more complete approach which, in addition to subtracting the net debt, considers also non-
operating assets and liabilities. Finally, we arrive to valuations of €7.680 or €7.976 Million (see 
TN-Exhibit 4) which represent share prices of approximately $46 or $47,90, both slightly 
below the given price range. 
Now let’s take a look at the valuation based on comparables firms (TN-Exhibit 2 and 
TN-Exhibit 3). Looking at the implied market capitalization for Ferrari from Tesla’s multiples 
we can conclude that the values are too big to be considered. The multiples attributed to Tesla 
are very big because it is a firm which is still in a high growth stage (sales growth of 59% in 
2014). Using other car automakers as comparables, the multiples lead to a lower valuation than 
the one obtained from the DCF which only shows us that Ferrari can’t be valued just as an 
automaker, it is a luxurious brand and should be valued as such. 
Now bearing in mind the implied market cap resulting from other luxury company 
multiples, and considering once again EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT, and looking only at firms 
with similar growth, one is lead to the following valuations, €5.319 and €5.698 Million of 
market capitalization. These figures are perceptibly below what was calculated in the DCF 
valuation, however, it must be remembered, only two comparable firms are being considered. 
Further, considering the median, the implied market for those two multiples are €7.963 and 
€7.850 Million, which in turn represent a price of $47,14 and $47,82 per share, values that are 




4. Are there positive synergies between Ferrari and FCA? 
The automotive industry requires significant investments in product design, 
engineering, research and development, technology, tooling, machinery and equipment, as well 
as facilities and marketing. Firms survive by leveraging their investments and activities on a 
global basis across brands and models, and thus benefitting from economies of scale and scope. 
Economies of scale because, with all the fixed costs mentioned above, it is clear that producing 
more products will lead to lower per-unit fixed cost since they are spread out over more units 
of output. Economies of scope because a factory can build more than one model of cars therefore 
the average total cost of production decreases due to the increase in the number of different 
goods produced, so in this case, it’s a gain from variety and not volume as with the scale 
economies. Additionally, larger firms usually have lower leverage, higher access to capital and 
a more diversified revenues base (more regions and products), tending to be better positioned 
to withstand industry downturns and to benefit from industry growth. 
 Given the above analysis, it would seem reasonable to expect positive synergies, but 
was that actually the case for FCA and Ferrari? Ferrari has always had its own plantxxxviii so 
benefits from being together such economies of scale and scope don’t really apply. Considering 
some of the other costs that were previously mentioned such as product design, engineering, 
marketing as well as research and development, although both firms are selling cars, the type 
of cars are quite different in terms of design (Ferrari makes sports cars), engineering (Ferrari’s 
cars are lot more focused on horse power and speed) or marketing (the target of both firms are 
completely different). Nevertheless, FCA can provide Ferrari access to technologies, therefore 
severing the connection between the firms may lead to a reduction in Ferrari’s value since it 
will be competing with other luxury brands that are integrated in big automotive groups. 
Overall, the synergies from FCA and Ferrari being together, if any, don’t seem overly 




5. Was FCA suffering from a conglomerate discount? If so, why didn’t they do a pure 
spin-off? 
Bearing in mind the type of players in the automotive industry, the majority of 
automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) produce vehicles for the mass market, 
however, there are some who produce vehicles for the luxury market like Ferrari. Among 
manufacturers of mass market vehicles, particularly for non-premium brands, the fierce 
competition compresses margins and requires significant volumes of vehicles to be profitable. 
On the other hand, luxury vehicles usually have higher margins which allows companies to 
produce lower volumes of vehicles while enhancing brand appeal and exclusivity and still 
maintain profitability. 
Here is where the differences between Ferrari and FCA come into play, they clearly 
operate in different segments, FCA producing for the mass market and Ferrari producing for 
the luxury market. This difference lead to considerable tension between the companies with the 
CEOs of each company disagreeing on the number of vehicles that should be produced by 
Ferrari. FCA CEO Marchione wanted to increase sales figures to 10.000 vehicles per year while 
the CEO of Ferrari Montezemolo didn’t want to boost production much beyond the 7.000 cars, 
sticking to the founder's mantra: "Always sell one car less than the market demands and 
maintain the value."xxxix The truth is, Ferrari has been successful with this strategy resulting in 
less volatile sales than the competitors’ as evidenced in Exhibit 9. This difference in objectives 
can be seen as a negative synergy for the group (FCA and Ferrari). Tension between corporate 
managers can negatively affect the group9 which wouldn’t happen if both companies were 
separate. 
                                                          
9 Investors may be taking this information into account thus it will have impact on the stock’s price. 
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As previously mentioned, Ferrari’s marketing needs, R&D requirements and so on are 
different than FCA’s. It is therefore possible that the market is attaching a lower multiple to the 
earnings and cash flows of the group due to the unified entity’s inability to manage the two 
businesses together as well as if they were separate, leading to a situation known as 
“conglomerate discount”. Ramachandran, Manikandan and Pant (2013) state that the typical 
conglomerate discount ranges from 6% to 12%xl. 
The Separation of Ferrari and FCA, “will enable the company to pursue its business 
strategies with greater operational and financial independence while preserving its unique 
character. As a standalone company with an iconic brand name, Ferrari will be better positioned 
to promote and extend the value of its brand, maintain its heritage, attract and reward technical 
and management talent and further enhance Ferrari’s position among the world’s premier luxury 
lifestyle companies”xli. Thus, by being a separate entity, Ferrari will gain from management 
focus, management will be compensated in function of the stock’s price performance, and the 
brand will also benefit. Even though Ferrari was already considered the world’s most powerful 
brand by Brand Finance in 2014xlii, which would indicate that making the brand even stronger 
would be difficult; by being part of a conglomerate, however, one could say that Ferrari’s brand 
value wasn’t being truly reflected by the market, particularly in FCA’s stock price, therefore, 
the separation will allow to unlock Ferrari’s hidden value. 
As mentioned earlier, FCA needed money to fund its business plan. An option would 
be to raise capital through debt, typically the cheapest form of financing after internal funds. 
Excessive leverage is another factor that can lead to a conglomerate discount: is that the case 
for FCAxliii? Looking at the Debt ratio (total Debt/total Assets) when compared to its 
competitors, FCA actually has reasonable level of Debt as one can see in TN-Exhibit 5, 
however if we consider Net Debt, FCA is not in the best position which indicates that it is highly 
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leveraged in comparison to its competitors which would make raising debt harder and more 
expensive. This may explain why they didn’t do a pure spin-off. 
There may be a loss of synergies in the demerger, but looking at the valuations of Ferrari 
and FCA without Ferrari, it is possible to conclude that FCA is indeed suffering from a 
conglomerate discount. Considering the lowest valuation that we saw for FCA (without Ferrari) 
in question 2 and Ferrari’s valuation from the DCF in question 3, by summing these two values 
we obtain €16.710 Million10 which is higher than FCA’s current market capitalization of 
€12.297 Million euros. As mentioned in a journal by Morgan Stanley’s, “spin-offs and other 
corporate restructuring and repackaging transactions are usually driven by a desire to improve 
the valuation of the constituent businesses”xliv. Therefore, Ferrari’s separation from FCA was 
one way to improve their valuations. 
 
6. Discuss the importance of the details of the IPO.  
(overallotment option, type of underwriting agreement and market chosen) 
In the IPO, FCA is planning to sell 17.175.000 shares representing approximately 9,09% 
Ferrari’s share capital, plus 1.717.150, which was approximately 0,91% of Ferrari’s share 
capital to cover the overallotment option. This is an option available to the underwriters which 
allows them to sell additional shares. It is usually exercised when demand for shares is high and 
shares are trading above the offering price. It allows the issuing company to raise additional 
capital and in this case, since the proceeds are for FCA, it means it raises more money from the 
IPO.  
Ferrari N.V. entered a firm commitment underwriting agreement and so the risk of not 
selling the entire issue is transferred to the syndicate. This is good for FCA who will receive 
the proceeds from the IPO. On the other hand, Ferrari still faces the risk of this small offering 
                                                          
10 €7.976M + €8.734M = €16.710 Million 
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not attracting enough investors and it could end up being a small stock or even an orphan stock. 
However, Ferrari is more likely to be valued as a luxury good and since there is a big hype 
surrounding its IPO, that situation is less likely.  
According to an article by PWC “…a firm's initial choice of capital market in which to 
make its first public equity offer is an important domain choice that may impact its growth and 
development in the long run. Businesses that undertake a cross-border IPO tend to do so because 
they are seeking benefits – such as greater liquidity or a more knowledgeable investor base – 
that may be easier to achieve in a foreign market.”xlv Cogman and Poon (2012) mention that 
aspects such as, “nonfinancial benefits – ease of access, regional proximity, or the expertise of 
the analyst and investor community in a specific location”xlvi should be considered. The market 
chosen was the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which was a good choice due to its 
credibility, higher level of liquidity due to the higher number of investors willing to invest in 
this exchange, all of which can help boost the brand. 
 
7. Discuss the IPO underpricing phenomenon. 
As mentioned by Ritter in one of his papersxlvii, “pricing an IPO is difficult because there 
is no observable market price prior to the offering…IPO underpricing is the best-known 
anomaly associated with the process of going public – the large initial returns – that is, the price 
changes measured from the offering price to the market price either at the end of the first day 
or within a few weeks”. 
According to a McKinsey publication, “some measure of underpricing is appropriate 
compensation for first-round investors who face levels of risk that they would not face for 
secondary offerings”xlviii. Ivanauskas (2015) in his master thesis mentions four theories for IPO 
underpricingxlix: “Winners curse hypothesis - Better informed investors (institutional) tend to 
bid only for attractively priced IPOs and not unattractive ones. Even though uninformed bid 
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indiscriminately, they are not able to absorb all the shares offered and that is why underpricing 
is necessary to incentivize and attract well informed institutional investors.”; “Market feedback 
hypothesis - investors are not incentivized to reveal information about their demand for the offer 
if the information is positive, because they know this would lead to a higher offer price from 
the issuer, which is disadvantageous to them. Thus, the issuer or the underwriter must under-
price the issue and provide profit for the investors in return of revealing positive information”; 
“Asymmetric information and signalling - Assumes that the firm is always better informed 
about its future prospects than anybody else. And by underpricing its public offering, the 
company is signalling about its favourable prospects to the general public”; “Principal agent 
problem - the initial underpricing can be connected to ownership structure and insider selling 
during the IPO period. They argue that these characteristics create incentives which later shape 
the behaviour towards underpricing. In other words, if managers of the company do not own 
part of the company, their incentives are not that strong to avoid underpricing compared to 
managers who are also owners.”  
Also, Oliver (2015), concludes that, “every country in Europe is affected by IPO 
Underpricing”l and that, “IPO Underpricing plays worldwide a significant role with the U.S. 
ranking in the middle with an average initial return of 16.8%”li. 
 
8. What may be the impact of the spin-off on the share price? 
The spin-off consists of transferring FCA’s remaining ownership11 in Ferrari N.V. after 
the IPO to its shareholders. This can have at least two impacts. Firstly, it can increase the 
liquidity of the stock. According to a study by PWC, “…financial assets with lower levels of 
liquidity tend to have higher liquidity risk premia, and market participants therefore tend to face 
higher transaction costs and wider bid-ask spreads when trading in these instruments”lii. In that 
                                                          
11 Approximately 80%, depending on the overallotment option. 
30 
 
sense, since there is an increase in liquidity for Ferrari’s shares, the liquidity risk premia will 
be lower, making the stock more valuable and leading to an increase in its price.  
Secondly, since many shareholders will receive shares of Ferrari N.V. and may not want 
them, if a sufficient number of them start selling, this may drive down the price – market 
impact12. Thus, understanding the market participants view is very important as is mentioned 
by PWC’s study on Mergers & acquisitions, “…a market participant's view is the foundation of 
fair value measurements. The intended use of an asset may vary for a market participant versus 
the buyer of that asset. Consideration of market participant assumptions is required even if the 
buyer will use the asset for a different purpose or has no intention of actively using the asset 
after the acquisition.”liii 
 On another note it is important to consider that spun-off companies tend to overperform 
as seen in Exhibit 19. As mentioned by Boreiko and Murgia (2013), “a significant component 
of stock price appreciation observed around spin-off announcement date is driven by the reverse 
of previous diversifying mergers”liv. In this case, Ferrari can be seen as a diversifying strategy 
for FCA however it should be the investors who diversify, not the firm. Chemmanur, Krishnan 
Nandy (2011) conclude that, “…spin-offs do increase overall efficiency and TFP (total factor 
productivity) for firms…”lv which explains in part why spun-off companies tend to perform 
well. Lastly, Uddin (2010) in his paper, argues that in addition to the benefits from, 
“…operational efficiency, reduced information asymmetry, reduced tax liability, and improved 
corporate governance…” there is an increase in shareholders’ value due to, “…redistribution of 
wealth from debtholders to shareholders…because assets of the subsidiary/division are 
transferred to a newly incorporated company where the parent bondholders have no claim on 
the assets and earnings…”lvi. 
 
                                                          




Predicting what will happen to Ferrari’s stock price during the IPO and after isn’t easy 
and taking into account that the valuation lead to values slightly lower than the indicated price 
range, I would recommend not to invest in Ferrari’s IPO. There seems to be substantial hype 
surrounding the IPO making it unlikely to suffer from underpricing. On the contrary, the price 
will probably decline and move towards its intrinsic value after the IPO, thus a buy and flip 
strategy will probably not work. 
Vestri’s most rationale decision would be to just wait until the spin-off in order to obtain 
shares from Ferrari which is likely to have a positive impact on the price of Ferrari’s shares. 
Regarding FCA, it appears to be going in the right direction, hence I would recommend that 
Vestri should maintain the holdings in this company at the least until Ferrari’s spin-off in order 
to obtain Ferrari’s shares. 
 
Case outcome 
It is interesting to look at the outcome of this case which can easily be summarized by 
TN-Exhibit 6 and TN-Exhibit 7 where we can see the evolution of both FCA’s and Ferrari’s 
stock price as well as the return. Ferrari presents a first day return close to 6%, which could 
indicate some level of underpricing, although it is far below the 14% Mean First-Day Return 
for IPOs in the period 2001 to 2016 as presented in Ritter’s statisticslvii. From the IPO up until 
the spin-off the return is negative but from the spin-off up to the 31st October 2017, Ferrari 
presents an average annual return of 66,15%. Regarding FCA, its average annual return since 
Ferrari’s IPO up till 31st October 2017 is 25,29% slightly below the MSCI’s index return of 
36,35% however considering only the period after the spin-off FCA’s average annual return is 











































14 DAIMLER AG 1.973.270
15 CHANGAN 1.447.017
16 MAZDA 1.328.426
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Exhibit 5 – Information of peers 
 






Total Assets Net Debt Total Debt EBIT EBITDA Net Income
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles 101.149,00 9.288,00 33.724,00 2.834,00 7.441,00 568,00
Tesla 4.818,73 481,30 2.056,26 -140,76 34,11 -221,70
Automotive industry
Renault 81.551,00 -2.805,00 35.756,00 1.249,00 3.960,00 1.890,00
Volkswagen 351.209,00 -15.900,00 133.980,00 12.697,00 29.488,00 10.985,00
Peugeot 61.212,00 -129,00 9.272,00 124,00 2.494,00 -706,00
BMW 154.803,00 36.591,00 77.506,00 9.141,00 16.865,00 5.798,00
Daimler 189.635,00 -21.442,00 69.847,00 9.388,00 14.387,00 6.962,00
Toyota 370.911,99 106.944,81 147.478,54 19.842,11 30.006,95 15.678,10
Hyundai 110.446,21 19.538,29 40.710,64 5.403,17 7.228,01 5.257,76
General Motors 146.695,04 -13.100,83 38.566,12 1.153,60 6.610,97 2.977,50
Ford 173.992,56 -7.914,88 98.488,43 250,32 5.847,18 928,16
Nissan 132.463,06 -10.803,80 51.842,64 4.253,00 9.909,46 3.300,86
Honda 143.188,52 41.094,28 52.531,20 4.837,62 9.347,92 3.674,98
Suzuki 25.277,75 -4.465,80 4.417,78 1.294,34 2.263,71 698,75
Tata 35.703,20 4.708,68 11.621,98 3.095,44 4.830,76 1.813,09
Mitsubishi 12.300,07 -2.182,23 1.239,16 980,45 1.430,93 852,46
Luxury companies
Louis Vuitton 53.362,00 4.319,00 9.243,00 5.436,00 7.331,00 5.648,00
Hermés 4.768,20 -1.400,30 41,30 1.299,30 1.445,20 858,80
Burberry 3.006,79 -764,01 90,21 561,24 737,91 428,68
Prada 4.738,88 -190,41 518,56 701,55 950,20 450,73
Christian Dior 60.030,00 7.527,00 10.555,00 6.001,00 8.137,00 2.378,00
Tiffany 4.589,48 341,15 989,15 681,60 830,06 370,21
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BV of Equity Market Cap Enterprise value Sales 2014 Sales 2013 Beta
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles 14.377,00 12.297,00 21.898,00 93.640,00 86.624,00 1,36
Tesla 753,48 23.046,42 23.527,71 2.411,52 1.516,43 0,94
Automotive industry
Renault 24.898,00 17.900,07 15.517,07 41.055,00 40.932,00 1,77
Volkswagen 90.189,00 86.501,13 75.840,13 202.458,00 197.007,00 1,54
Peugeot 10.418,00 8.003,17 9.021,17 51.592,00 53.079,00 1,85
BMW 37.437,00 57.675,39 94.483,39 80.401,00 76.059,00 1,41
Daimler 44.584,00 73.786,69 53.263,69 129.872,00 117.982,00 1,63
Toyota 137.138,68 177.881,06 278.558,31 196.465,32 191.500,95 1,11
Hyundai 46.977,07 27.926,96 51.438,80 63.876,51 60.085,45 1,12
General Motors 29.771,90 46.355,18 33.722,95 117.568,71 117.057,23 1,58
Ford 20.501,65 49.301,37 41.691,45 108.632,43 110.648,06 1,28
Nissan 40.776,86 32.902,83 26.156,82 82.058,86 78.134,03 1,08
Honda 57.372,44 43.979,93 82.280,55 96.146,70 93.217,21 1,24
Suzuki 13.221,63 14.062,16 11.613,43 21.753,04 21.901,44 1,05
Tata 8.481,60 19.566,00 23.736,92 33.515,74 28.186,78 1,61
Mitsubishi 5.212,57 7.518,30 5.668,10 15.731,41 15.603,74 1,25
Luxury companies
Louis Vuitton 23.003,00 72.238,30 77.797,30 30.638,00 29.016,00 1,12
Hermés 3.458,50 31.121,86 29.731,06 4.118,60 3.754,80 0,49
Burberry 2.008,26 9.365,44 8.719,53 3.216,28 2.762,51 1,50
Prada 3.018,15 11.986,54 11.813,54 3.551,70 3.587,35 0,61
Christian Dior 26.320,00 25.968,79 49.542,79 35.081,00 30.867,00 1,09
Tiffany 2.525,40 11.423,76 11.754,92 3.249,56 3.029,69 1,23
Sales 2014 Sales 2013 EBITDA EBIT
FCA (w/o Ferrari) 90.877,64 84.288,73 7.293,55 2.429,51
Ferrari 2.762,36 2.335,27 678,45 404,50
Earnings BV of Equity Net Debt
FCA (w/o Ferrari) 306,63 11.898,69 10.508,06
Ferrari 261,37 2.478,31 375,94
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Assets
Total Current Assets 49.568,00 35.385,00 35.470,00 38.166,00 44.173,00
   Cash, Cash Equivalents & STI 12.186,00 17.758,00 17.945,00 19.721,00 22.840,00
   Accounts & Notes Receiv 4.289,00 5.510,00 5.348,00 5.165,00 7.653,00
   Inventories 4.443,00 9.123,00 9.295,00 10.230,00 10.449,00
   Other ST Assets 28.650,00 2.994,00 2.882,00 3.050,00 3.231,00
Total Noncurrent Assets 23.874,00 44.646,00 46.636,00 48.608,00 56.976,00
   Property, Plant & Equip, Net 9.601,00 20.785,00 22.061,00 22.843,00 26.408,00
   LT Investments & Receivables 1.024,00 2.209,00 1.862,00 1.612,00 700,00
   Other LT Assets 13.249,00 21.652,00 22.713,00 24.153,00 29.868,00
Total Assets 73.442,00 80.031,00 82.106,00 86.774,00 101.149,00
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
Total Current Liabilities 42.947,00 30.688,00 30.582,00 33.788,00 43.385,00
   Payables & Accruals 12.049,00 20.769,00 21.169,00 22.548,00 20.150,00
   ST Debt 7.829,00 6.073,00 5.811,00 7.138,00 7.710,00
   Other ST Liabilities 23.069,00 3.846,00 3.602,00 4.102,00 15.525,00
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 18.034,00 37.083,00 43.155,00 40.402,00 43.387,00
   LT Debt 12.975,00 20.699,00 22.078,00 22.764,00 26.014,00
   Other LT Liabilities 5.059,00 16.384,00 21.077,00 17.638,00 17.373,00
Total Liabilities 60.981,00 67.771,00 73.737,00 74.190,00 86.772,00
   Share Capital & APIC 6.377,00 4.466,00 4.476,00 4.477,00 17,00
   Treasury Stock -657,00 -289,00 -259,00 -259,00 0,00
   Retained Earnings 4.145,00 3.862,00 3.798,00 4.721,00 0,00
   Other Equity 1.679,00 688,00 -1.828,00 -613,00 14.047,00
Equity Before Minority Interest 11.544,00 8.727,00 6.187,00 8.326,00 14.064,00
   Minority/Non Controlling Interest 917,00 3.533,00 2.182,00 4.258,00 313,00
Total Equity 12.461,00 12.260,00 8.369,00 12.584,00 14.377,00
Total Liabilities & Equity 73.442,00 80.031,00 82.106,00 86.774,00 101.149,00
Source: Bloomberg









2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Revenue 35.880,00 59.559,00 83.957,00 86.816,00 93.640,00
COGS 30.718,00 50.704,00 71.701,00 74.570,00 81.592,00
Gross Profit 5.162,00 8.855,00 12.256,00 12.246,00 12.048,00
Other Operating Income 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 131,00
Operating Expenses 4.050,00 6.669,00 8.715,00 8.852,00 6.973,00
Selling, General & Admin 2.956,00 5.047,00 6.763,00 6.689,00
Research & Development 1.013,00 1.367,00 1.850,00 2.231,00 2.334,00
Other Operating Expense 81,00 255,00 102,00 -68,00 -493,00
Operating Income (Loss) 1.112,00 2.186,00 3.541,00 3.394,00 3.365,00
Non-Operating (Income) Loss 227,00 1.099,00 1.721,00 1.763,00 2.041,00
Interest Expense, Net 489,00 1.088,00 1.524,00 1.490,00 1.293,00
Other Non-Operating (Income) Loss -262,00 11,00 197,00 273,00 748,00
Abnormal Losses (Gains) 179,00 -1.098,00 301,00 623,00 541,00
Pretax Income (Loss) 706,00 2.185,00 1.519,00 1.008,00 783,00
Income Tax Expense (Benefit) 484,00 534,00 623,00 -943,00 424,00
Minority Interest 80,00 317,00 852,00 1.047,00 64,00
Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -273,00
Net Income 520,00 1.334,00 44,00 904,00 568,00
Basic Weighted Avg Shares 1.236,88 1.237,21 1.215,83 1.215,92 1.222,35
Basic EPS 0,42 1,08 0,04 0,74 0,47
Source: Bloomberg









Exhibit 9 – Ferrari’s sales compared to Luxury Performance Car Industry 
 








Exhibit 11 – Structure of the demerger of Fiat S.p.A.’s industrial activities 
 
1 Auto includes FGA (with its stake in Chrysler), Maserati and Ferrari. 





FI – Fiat Industrial 
CNH – Agricultural and 
Construction equipment 
Iveco – Heavy commercial 
vehicles (trucks) 
I&M – Industrial and Marine 
FPT - Fiat Powertrain 
Technologies 








Ferrari’s debt average maturity is 1,1 years (source: Ferrari’s IPO prospectus). 
  





Total Current Assets 2.844,66 41.328,35
   Cash, Cash Equivalents & STI 134,28 22.705,72
   Accounts & Notes Receiv 183,64 7.469,36
   Inventories 296,01 10.153,00
   Other ST Assets 2.230,73 1.000,27
Total Noncurrent Assets 1.796,77 55.179,23
   Property, Plant & Equip, Net 585,19 25.822,82
   LT Investments & Receivables 47,43 652,57
   Other LT Assets 1.164,16 28.703,84
Total Assets 4.641,43 96.507,57
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
Total Current Liabilities 1.240,64 42.144,36
   Payables & Accruals 645,22 19.504,78
   ST Debt 491,32 7.218,68
   Other ST Liabilities 104,09 15.420,91
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 922,48 42.464,52
   LT Debt 18,90 25.995,10
   Other LT Liabilities 903,58 16.469,42
Total Liabilities 2.163,11 84.608,89
   Share Capital & APIC 0,00 17,00
   Retained Earnings 2.507,39 -2.507,39
   Other Equity -37,77 14.084,77
Equity Before Minority Interest 2.469,62 11.594,38
   Minority/Non Controlling Interest 8,70 304,31
Total Equity 2.478,31 11.898,69














Gross profit 1.256,47 10.791,53
Other Operating Income 0,00 131,00
Operating Expenses 851,98 7.962,02
Selling, General & Admin 285,06 6.687,94
Research & Development 540,83 1.793,17
Other Operating Expense 26,08 -519,08 
Operating Income (Loss) 404,50 2.960,51
Interes expense 7,94 1.517,06
Other Non-Operating (Income) Loss -16,71 532,71
Abnormal Losses (Gains) 15,03 525,97
Income before taxes 398,23 384,77
Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0,00 -273,00 
Income Tax Expense 133,22 290,78
Minority interest 3,64 60,36




















Base year 1 2 3 4 5
Revenue growth rate 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00%
Revenues 2.763,00€  2.873,52€  2.988,46€  3.108,00€  3.232,32€  3.361,61€      
EBIT (Operating) margin 18,20% 18,20% 18,20% 18,20% 18,20% 18,20%
EBIT (Operating income) 502,83€     522,94€     543,86€     565,62€     588,24€     611,77€         
Tax rate 33,54% 33,54% 33,54% 33,54% 33,54% 33,54%
EBIT(1-t) 334,18€     347,54€     361,44€     375,90€     390,94€     406,58€         
 - Reinvestment 77,76€       80,87€       84,11€       87,47€       90,97€           
FCFF 269,78€     280,57€     291,80€     303,47€     315,61€         
6 7 8 9 10 Terminal year
Revenue growth rate 3,34% 2,68% 2,02% 1,36% 0,70% 0,70%
Revenues 3.473,89€  3.566,99€  3.639,04€  3.688,53€  3.714,35€  3.740,35€      
EBIT (Operating) margin 18,20% 18,20% 18,20% 18,20% 18,20% 18,20%
EBIT (Operating income) 632,20€     649,15€     662,26€     671,27€     675,96€     680,70€         
Tax rate 33,54% 33,54% 33,54% 33,54% 33,54% 33,54%
EBIT(1-t) 420,16€     431,42€     440,13€     446,12€     449,24€     452,38€         
 - Reinvestment 79,00€       65,50€       50,70€       34,82€       18,17€       21,75€           
FCFF 341,16€     365,91€     389,43€     411,30€     431,07€     430,63€         
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Exhibit 17 – Ferrari’s restructuring 
 
Based on information from Ferrari N.V.’s prospectus.  
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Spot-rate (Euros/USD) 1,1346 Bloomberg
Market risk premium (Europe) 5,50% KPMG
Ferrari's tax rate 27,50% Prospectus
> ≤ to
-100000 0,199999 D2/D 12,00%
0,2 0,649999 Caa/CCC 10,00%
0,65 0,799999 Ca2/CC 8,00%
0,8 1,249999 C2/C 7,00%
1,25 1,499999 B3/B- 6,00%
1,5 1,749999 B2/B 5,00%
1,75 1,999999 B1/B+ 4,00%
2 2,2499999 Ba2/BB 3,25%
2,25 2,49999 Ba1/BB+ 2,75%
2,5 2,999999 Baa2/BBB 1,75%
3 4,249999 A3/A- 1,20%
4,25 5,499999 A2/A 1,00%
5,5 6,499999 A1/A+ 0,90%
6,5 8,499999 Aa2/AA 0,70%
8,50 100000 Aaa/AAA 0,40%
Source: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/valquestions/syntrating.htm
Government Bond Yields (Germany)
Bloomberg
If interest coverage ratio is
Rating is Spread is
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Exhibit 20 – The Spin-off 
 
 


















TN-Exhibit 1: FCA’s profit margin 
 
 










2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Multiples EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/E Market to Book Growth rate
Tesla 9,76x 689,72x N/A N/A 30,59x 59,03%
Automotive industry
Renault 0,38x 3,92x 12,42x 9,47x 0,72x 0,30%
Volkswagen 0,37x 2,57x 5,97x 7,87x 0,96x 2,77%
Peugeot 0,17x 3,62x 72,75x N/A 0,77x -2,80%
BMW 1,18x 5,60x 10,34x 9,95x 1,54x 5,71%
Daimler 0,41x 3,70x 5,67x 10,60x 1,66x 10,08%
Toyota 1,42x 9,28x 14,04x 11,35x 1,30x 2,59%
Hyundai 0,81x 7,12x 9,52x 5,31x 0,59x 6,31%
General Motors 0,29x 5,10x 29,23x 15,57x 1,56x 0,44%
Ford 0,38x 7,13x 166,55x 53,12x 2,40x -1,82%
Nissan 0,32x 2,64x 6,15x 9,97x 0,81x 5,02%
Honda 0,86x 8,80x 17,01x 11,97x 0,77x 3,14%
Suzuki 0,53x 5,13x 8,97x 20,12x 1,06x -0,68%
Tata 0,71x 4,91x 7,67x 10,79x 2,31x 18,91%
Mitsubishi 0,36x 3,96x 5,78x 8,82x 1,44x 0,82%
Luxury companies
Louis Vuitton 2,54x 10,61x 14,31x 12,79x 3,14x 5,59%
Hermés 7,22x 20,57x 22,88x 36,24x 9,00x 9,69%
Burberry 2,71x 11,82x 15,54x 21,85x 4,66x 16,43%
Prada 3,33x 12,43x 16,84x 26,59x 3,97x -0,99%
Christian Dior 1,41x 6,09x 8,26x 10,92x 0,99x 13,65%






Implied Market Cap EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/E Market to Book
Min 5.382,44 8.250,21 3.275,96 1.628,68 7.073,54
Max 118.342,78 57.198,90 394.125,41 16.287,31 28.613,38
Median 25.566,23 26.013,53 13.612,48 3.249,80 14.044,39
Similar growth* 51.046,05 24.247,02 8.733,71 2.746,28 13.674,51
*BMW, Daimler, Hyundai, Nissan
Ferrari Multiples Valuation
Implied Market Cap EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/E Market to Book
Tesla 26.574,65 467.564,28 N/A N/A 75.803,33
Automotive industry
Min 107,07 1.368,96 1.919,00 1.388,29 1.473,31
Max 3.540,67 5.922,20 66.992,60 13.883,32 5.959,73
Median 720,59 3.021,32 3.639,95 2.770,14 2.925,23
Similar growth** 1.168,71 2.546,79 2.322,43 2.340,93 2.848,19
**Tata, Daimler
Luxury companies
Min 3.525,17 3.754,86 2.963,47 2.854,29 2.445,24
Max 19.564,79 13.581,32 8.879,86 9.471,77 22.301,49
Median 7.962,56 7.849,98 6.171,88 6.330,53 10.526,68
Similar growth*** 5.319,08 5.697,89 4.435,90 4.282,27 7.001,38
***Burberry, Dior
(In millions of Euros)
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Ferrari's comparable multiples valuation
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TN-Exhibit 4: WACC and output of DCF valuation 
  
Risk-free 0,54% Tesla's Beta 0,94
Market risk premium 5,50% Tesla's Unlevered Beta 0,89
Unlevered Beta (Tesla) 0,89 Tesla's Market Cap 23.046,42
Levered Beta 0,93 Tesla's Debt 2.056,26
Cost of equity 5,64% Tax rate 35,00%
Interest expense 7,94
EBIT 404,50
Interest coverage ratio 50,92
Estimated Bond Rating Aaa/AAA
Estimated Company Default Spread 0,40%
Estimated pre-tax cost of Debt 0,94%
Number of shares 188,92
Considered share price $ 50,00
Spot-rate 1,1346
Implied Market Cap 8.325,47
Book value of Debt 510,22
Average maturity (years) 1,1





1 2 3 4 5
FCF 269,78 280,57 291,80 303,47 315,61
PV of FCF 256,07 252,78 249,53 246,32 243,15
6 7 8 9 10
FCF 341,16 365,91 389,43 411,30 431,07
PV of FCF 249,48 253,98 256,57 257,20 255,86
PV of Terminal Value 5.535,29
Value of Operations 8.056,22 long-term growth rate 0,70%
(Damodaran's assumption)
Value of Operations 8.056,22 Value of Operations 8.056,22
- Net Debt 375,94 - Market value of Debt 513,66
Market Cap (€) 7.680,28€  - Minority Interest 8,70
Share price (€) 40,65€       + Cash & cash equivalents 134,28
Share price ($) 46,13$       + Non-operating assets 1211,59
- Non-operating liabilities 903,58
Market Cap (€) 7.976,15€     
Share price (€) 42,22€          
Share price ($) 47,90$          
(in millions of euros except if stated otherwise)
Method 1 Method 2 - more complete
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TN-Exhibit 5: FCA’s Debt level 
 
 
TN-Exhibit 6: Evolution Ferrari’s and FCA’s stock price 
 
Source: Bloomberg  






































TN-Exhibit 7: Ferrari and FCA’s return 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
Date Price Date Price
20-10-2015 52,00$                   20-10-2015 52,00$                                 
21-10-2015 55,00$                   04-01-2016 47,39$                                 
Return 5,77% Return -8,87%
Date Price Date Price
20-10-2015 52,00$                   04-01-2016 47,39$                                 
31-10-2017 119,68$                 31-10-2017 119,68$                               
Return 130,15% Return 152,54%
Average annual return 50,69% Average annual return 66,15%
Date Price Date Price
20-10-2015 9,34€                     20-10-2015 9,34€                                   
31-10-2017 14,84€                   04-01-2016 8,07€                                   
Return 58,92% Return -13,56%
Average annual return 25,59%
Date Price
04-01-2016 8,07€                                   
31-10-2017 14,84€                                 
Return 83,84%
Average annual return 39,61%
Date Price Date Price
20-10-2015 53,65€                   20-10-2015 53,65€                                 
31-10-2017 100,76€                 04-01-2016 65,27€                                 
Return 87,81% Return 21,67%
Average annual return 36,35%
Date Price
04-01-2016 65,27€                                 
31-10-2017 100,76€                               
Return 54,37%
Average annual return 26,86%
Ferrari's return
First day return Return up to Spin-off completion
Return since Ferrari's IPO
MSCI Index's return
Return since Ferrari's IPO Return up to Spin-off completion
Return from Spin-off completion up to now
Return from IPO up to now Return from Spin-off completion up to now
Return up to Spin-off completion
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